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ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

1.

Whether, under former U.C.A. § 78-27-37 (1973), applicable to

this action, the trial Court properly instructed the jury that
the negligence of appellant's decedent should be compared to that
of the respondents for purposes of determining liability and
damages.
2.

Whether the trial Court erred in ruling that the siblings of

Darin Kelson could not recover damages under Utah's Wrongful
Death Act.
3.

Whether the trial Court abused its discretion in refusing to

grant appellant relief from a Stipulation concerning the alleged
blood alcohol content of Darin Kelson at the time of his death.
These issues were all briefed and argued several times before
the trial Court.

Judge Murphy instructed the jury that Darin

Kelson's negligence should be compared to that of defendants.
The jury subsequently apportioned liability 25% to defendant
Buckner and 75% to Darin Kelson, on which basis the Court entered
its judgment NO CAUSE OF ACTION.

The Court also ruled, as a

matter of law that the siblings of Darin Kelson were not entitled
to recover for his wrongful death; and permitted the Stipulation
complained of to be read into evidence.

1

The issues presented on appeal are all questions of law which
may be resolved by this Court without reference to transcripts of
the pleadings below.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
1.

Former Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986),

provided:
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - DIMINISHMENT OF DAMAGES - "CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE" INCLUDES "ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK."
Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action
by any person or his legal representative to recover damages for
negligence or gross negligence resulting in death or in injury to
person or property, if such negligence was not as great as the
negligence

or gross negligence

of the person

against

whom

recovery is sought, but any damages allowed shall be diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the
person

recovering.

As

used

in

this

Act,

"contributory

negligence" includes "assumption of the risk."

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal involves a wrongful death action brought by
Darrell Kelson, as personal representative of the heirs of Darin
Kelson,
Buckner.

against

Salt

Lake County

and Police

Officer

Perry

The matter was tried to a jury with Judge Michael R.

Murphy, Third District Court, Salt Lake County, presiding.

2

On

January 29, 1987, the jury returned a Special Verdict finding
that the conduct of both Buckner and Kelson proximately caused
the death.
Kelson.

The fault was attributed 25% to Buckner and 75% to
Having

previously

ruled

that

the

negligence

of

appellant's decedent should be compared to that of respondents,
judgment for respondents was duly entered on February 4, 1987.

FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES ON REVIEW
A. With Respect To The Contributory Negligence Issue:
1. The heirs of Darin Kelson did not cause or contribute to
the cause of his death in any way.
2. Nevertheless, the trial Court instructed the jury that
the negligence, if any, of Darin Kelson should be compared to
that of respondents in determining whether, and what amount
of damages

could be

recovered

by his parents.

(See,

Instruction Nos. 32 and 33 attached hereto as Exhibit A.)
3. The Special Verdict Form also required the

jury to

determine the percentage of Darin Kelson's negligence and
compare

it to that of respondents as a prerequisite to

determining damages.

(See, the Special Verdict attached

hereto as Exhibit E.)
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B.

With Respect To The Blood Alcohol Stipulation Issue:
1. Appellant was o r i g i n a l l y represented by Robert DeBry and
Associates.
2. Mr.

DeBry,

without

appellant's

authorization

or

permission, transferred the case to Robert B. Hansen.
3. From the outset of h i s " r e p r e s e n t a t i o n " of a p p e l l a n t ,
Mr. Hansen was a n t a g o n i s t i c

and argumentative with

the

appellant concerning the case.
4. Mr. Hansen was t o l d

repeatedly

and c o n t i n u a l l y

by

a p p e l l a n t and h i s family t h a t Darin Kelson had not been
drinking

and was not

collision.

intoxicated

at

t h e time

of

the

The family wanted t h a t issue l i t i g a t e d to the

f u l l e s t extent. fSee, l e t t e r dated July 2 6, 1985, from Robert
Hansen to Darrell Kelson attached hereto as Exhibit C .

Note

t h a t no disclosure of the Stipulation is made t h e r e i n . ]
5. Nevertheless, on February 19, 1985, Mr. Hansen, without
the knowledge, consent or authorization of h i s c l i e n t s , and
in fact

against

the express d i r e c t i o n s

of h i s

clients,

entered into a Stipulation, the effect of which was to admit
that

Darin Kelson was i n t o x i c a t e d

collision.

at

the

time

of

the

fSee. Affidavits of Robert Hansen and D a r r e l l

Kelson, attached hereto as Exhibits D &E .]
6. Mr. Hansen received absolutely nothing in exchange for
the Stipulation.

4

7. Because appellant was concerned about Mr. Hansen's
"representation",

Darrell Kelson sent a letter to Mr. Hansen

on April 25, 1985, instructing Mr. Hansen to do nothing on
the case without his express permission.

Even though the

Stipulation had been executed at the time, Mr. Hansen did not
inform appellant of its existence or its impact on the case.
rsee, letter attached hereto as Exhibit F. ]
8. Mr. Hansen withdrew from the case on August 21, 1985,
without disclosing the existence of the Stipulation to
appellant.
9. Appellant then learned that Mr. Hansen had never
performed any substantive work on the case. After nearly a
year on the matter, Mr. Hansen wanted to bill appellant for
the three hours of work he had done on the case, rsee, letter
from Robert Hansen to Darrell Kelson dated August 26, 1985,
attached as Exhibit G.]
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Comparative Negligence Statute applicable to this action,
U.C.A., § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986), provides in relevant
part:
[A]ny damages allowed shall be diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence
attributable to the person recovering.

5

Under this unambiguous language, the damages recoverable by a
decedent's heirs in a wrongful death action can not be diminished
by any negligence attributable to the decedent.
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has unequivocally held that
an action

for wrongful death brought by or on behalf of a

decedent's heirs is not derivative to an action which is or could
be brought by the decedent or his estate.
P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1978).

Hull v. Silver, 577

In every jurisdiction that has ruled

on the issue, those with non-derivative actions have held that
damages recoverable by a decedent's heirs cannot be diminished by
any percentage of negligence attributable to the decedent.
During pre-trial motions, the Court ruled that Darin Kelson's
siblings were not eligible to recover damages under the Utah
wrongful death statute.

The only justification for this position

is a literal application of the term "heirs" found in the Probate
Code, which is totally irrelevant to a wrongful death action.
Moreover, it is illogical to deny damages to persons resulting
from the wrongful death of an immediate family member.
Finally, the trial judge refused to grant appellant relief
from a Stipulation concerning the alleged blood alcohol content
of Darin Kelson at the time of the collision.

The Stipulation

was executed by former counsel without appellant's knowledge,
consent or authorization.

It involves the single most damaging

piece of "evidence" presented by the respondents.

6

Under the

circumstances, it was an abuse of discretion for the trial Court
to admit the Stipulation and constituted prejudicial reversible
error.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE

TRIAL

COURT

ERRED

IN

RULING

THAT

THE

NEGLIGENCE

OF

APPELLANT'S DECEDENT DARIN KELSON, SHOULD BE COMPARED WITH
THAT OF RESPONDENTS IN A WRONGFUL DEATH CASE.
At

trial,

the

jury

was

instructed

that

under

Utah's

C o m p a r a t i v e N e g l i g e n c e A c t , t h e n e g l i g e n c e of D a r i n Kelson s h o u l d
be compared t o t h a t of r e s p o n d e n t s i n d e t e r m i n i n g l i a b i l i t y

and

damages.

and

That

instruction

constituted reversible

was

contrary

to

the

law

error.

A. The Language Of Former Q.C.A. § 7 8 - 2 7 - 3 7 U n a m b i g u o u s l y
P r o h i b i t s Damages Awarded A D e c e d e n t ' s H e i r s In A Wrongful Death

Action To Be Diminished By The Proportion Of The Decedent's
Negligence.
Utah's Comparative Negligence Statute 1 passed in 1973 s t a t e s
unequivocally t h a t "any damages allowed s h a l l be diminished in
proportion to the amount of negligence a t t r i b u t a b l e to the person

1

The S t a t u t e was r e p e a l e d in 1986. However, s i n c e t h e e v e n t s t h a t a r e t h e
s u b j e c t of t h i s appeal o c c u r r e d in 1983, t h e former s t a t u t e a p p l i e s .
Note
however, t h a t even t h e p r e s e n t § 78-27-38 (1986) p r o v i d e s : "The f a u l t of t h e
person seeking recovery s h a l l not alone bar recovery by t h a t p e r s o n . He may
recover from any defendant or group of defendants whose f a u l t exceeds h i s own.
[Emphasis added.]
7

recovering."

In this case the persons recovering are the heirs

of Darin Kelson, his parents.

They were not negligent, and their

recovery cannot, under the plain language of the statute, be
diminished by the negligence of someone else.

B. Recovery Qf Damages By Heirs In A Wrongful Death Action
Cannot Be Reduced By The Proportion Of Negligence Attributable To

A Decedent In Jurisdictions Which Hold That Such Actions Are NonDerivative.
1. The Utah Supreme Court Has Held That Wrongful
Actions Are Not D e r i v a t i v e .
In Hull v . S i l v e r , 577 P.2d 103, 104 (Utah 1 9 7 8 ) , 2
Supreme

Court

derivative.

stated

that

a wrongful

death

action

Rather, i t i s a new and independent a c t i o n ,

Death

t h e Utah
is not
separate

and d i s t i n c t from any cause of a c t i o n t h e decedent may have had,
which b e l o n g s e x c l u s i v e l y t o t h e d e c e d e n t ' s h e i r s . 3
recoverable a r e those suffered

by t h e h e i r s .

The damages

No r e c o v e r y i s

allowed under t h e wrongful d e a t h s t a t u t e , U.C.A. § 78-11-7, f o r
any i n j u r i e s or damages s u f f e r e d by t h e d e c e d e n t , n o r does any
p a r t of t h e recovery pass through t h e d e c e d e n t ' s e s t a t e .

Switzer

v. Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 247 (Utah 1980).

^ I n H u l l r the Court held that since a wrongful death action is not
derivative, such an action brought by a deceased's heirs is not subject to the
defense of interspousal tort immunity.
3 Contrast any recovery under Utahfs "Survival Statute," U.C.A § 78-11-12.
There, the personal representative may claim and recover damages suffered by
the decedent prior to his death.
These damages belong to the decedent's
estate and would be diminished by the percentage of decedent's contributory
negligence, if any.
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2.
Pre-1973 Utah Decisions Barring Recovery By Heirs
Where The Decedent Was Contributorily Negligent Are Irrelevant.
Counsel for respondents and the trial Court below relied
exclusively on Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 112
Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293

(1947), for the proposition that the

contributory negligence of a decedent may be applied to reduce
the recovery of his heirs in a wrongful death action.
It should be enough to point out that Van Wagoner pre-dates
the enactment of the Comparative Negligence Statute which is the
controlling law applicable to this case.

However, some confusion

occurs because Van Wagoner was cited, seemingly with approval, in
Hull.

Careful analysis of the context of Hull and its language

dispels that confusion.
It

is

true

that

prior

to

the

adoption

of

comparative

negligence in 1973, contributory negligence on the part of the
decedent was a complete bar to an action by his heirs.
and this is the key point:

However,

The basis for that result was not

that the decedent's negligence was attributed to the heirs;
rather, under the law as it existed, the decedent's contributory
negligence rendered the tortfeasor's conduct not wrongful.
In Van Wagoner the Court stated:
The right of action running to appellants in
this case is founded on the same unlawful acts
of the defendant, but the loss and damages
suffered by them arise out of the death of the
deceased.
The legislature has thus said the
right of action vests in the heirs-at-law if

9

death ensues but it does not say the rights of
third parties are modified, altered or changed.
On t h e contrary, it bases recovery on the

wrongful death by another and wrongful is used
in Uie sense of wrongful as against the
deceased, and does not include those situations
where £h£
deceased solely or proximately
contributes negligently to his own death.
rvan Wagoner, supra, 112 Utah 218-219, 189 P.2d 701 (emphasis
added).]

See alSQ, Johnson v. Ottomeier, 45 Wash.2d 149, 275

P.2d 723 (1954), cited in Hull, supra, at 105/ which held:
The statutory basis for recognizing defenses of
this character [(i.e.) contributory negligence],
is to be found in the word 'wrongful1 as used in

the stcitute.

If the tortfeasor breached no duty

owing bo decedent, or if decedent proximately

contributed, through consent, negligence, an
unlawful
acts, to his own injury, it is
reasonable to say that his death was not
wrongful in the contemplation of the statute,
(emphasis added.)
Thus, prior
wrongful

to 1973, heirs could not

death

statute

even

if the

recover under
decedent

was

Utah's
only

1%

negligent, because any negligence on the part of the decedent
rendered the defendant's acts not wrongful under the statute.
Adoption of the Comparative Negligence Act changed all that.
After 1973, a plaintiff could recover even if his own negligence
contributed

to

Consequently,

his

injuries

to

an

extent

less

in a wrongful death action, the

than 50%.

tortfeasor's

conduct would still be considered wrongful even if the decedent
contributed to his own death.

More important however, the 1973

Comparative Negligence Act eliminated any consideration of the

10

decedent's negligence in a wrongful death action with the
language: "Any damages allowed shall be diminished in proportion
to the

amount

recovering."

of negligence

attributable

to the person

Consequently, decisions by the Utah Supreme Court

prior to 1973 barring recovery by heirs in wrongful death actions
when the decedent was contributorily negligent are irrelevant and
of no value as precedent in this case..
So far as appellant has been able to determine, no case
decided by the Utah Supreme Court since 1973 has addressed the
issue presented in this appeal.4 Appellant contends that the law
4

But see, Phillips v. Tooele City Corp.. 28 Utah 2d 233, 500 P.2d 669 (Utah
1972) . There, plaintiffs brought an action to recover property damages to
their vehicle which had been involved in a collision while driven by their
minor daughter. At trial, the jury determined that the minor driver had been
contributorily negligent.
The trial court imputed that negligence to the
plaintiffs as a matter of law and barred their recovery.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court rejected the imputation of negligence
and remanded the matter for a new trial to determine the negligence of the
defendant, if any, and damages. The Court relied on its interpretation of
Sizemore v. Bailey's Administrator, 293 S.W.2d 165-168-69 (Ky. 1956), to the
effect that:
Since the statute ru.C.A. § 41-2-10] did not specifically
provide that the contributory negligence of a minor would
preclude recovery for damages inflicted by a third party,
the court declined to read in by judicial fiat such a
provision. [Id. at 673.]
The Court held:
However, the legislative policy to broaden liability for
the protection of an injured plaintiff gives no support
to the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence which
narrows the liability of a negligent defendant to a

plaintiff, who is innocent of actual negligence,
rid, (emphasis added).]
The Phillips decision is important here since it underscores this Court's by
now thorough rejection of the doctrine of imputed negligence, and because it
is actually consistent with appellant's position in this case.
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is crystal clear;

The negligence of Darin Kelson can not be

compared to t h a t of the respondents in t h i s a c t i o n for

the

purpose of barring or diminishing the damages recoverable by his
heirs.
3. The Law In Other J u r i s d i c t i o n s i s Unanimous. Where
Actions for Damages to Family Members Resulting From Injury or
Death to Another are Held to be Non-Derivative, the Negligence of
the Deceased or Injured Person i s Not Applied t o Bar or Reduce
the Recovery By His Family.
In every j u r i s d i c t i o n which holds that wrongful death actions
or claims for loss of consortium due to i n j u r i e s of a family
member are non-derivative, i t i s also held that the negligence of
the decedent or injured party cannot be applied to diminish or
defeat the independent claims of those e n t i t l e d to recover.
The cases

that

follow

are

highlighted

as

examples

of

decisions from j u r i s d i c t i o n s with case and s t a t u t o r y law similar
to Utah.5

a.

Feltch v. General Rental

In Feltch v. General Rental Company, 421 N.E.2d 67 (Mass.
1981), an injured worker and his wife brought s u i t for personal
injury damages and loss of consortium r e s p e c t i v e l y .

The jury

5 Many of t h e c a s e s c i t e d i n support of a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n i n v o l v e claims
for l o s s of consortium due t o an i n j u r y t o a spouse or family member. Utah
does not allow l o s s of consortium claims r e s u l t i n g from i n j u r i e s , as opposed
t o d e a t h . £££, Hackford v. Utah Power & Light Co., 59 U.A.R. 21 (Utah 1987).
However, s i n c e t h i s i s a death c a s e , t h a t d i s t i n c t i o n makes no d i f f e r e n c e t o
t h e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e law.
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found plaintiff Feltch
negligent.

37.5% negligent

and defendant 62.5%

The damages awarded Mr. Feltch were reduced by the

percentage of his negligence.

On appeal, one issue was whether

his wife's damages for loss of consortium

should have been

similarly reduced.
The Court, noting that under Massachusetts law the wife's
claim was not derivative, held that her damages should not be
reduced.

The Court also declined to impute the negligence of

Donald Feltch to his wife.

More significantly the Court relied

on language from the Massachusetts Comparative Negligence Statute
that

is essentially

position.

the

same as Utah's

in support

of its

The Court stated:

The language of the Massachusetts Comparative
Negligence Statute, G.L. c. 231, § 85 (1973),
also suggests that a spouse's negligence is not
to be imputed to the other spouse. The statute
provides that, in determining by what amount a
negligent plaintiff's damages are to be
diminished, "the negligence of each plaintiff
shall be compared to the total negligence of all
persons against whom recovery is sought."

(citation omitted). Ann Feltch was not found to
be negligent, and the statute does not indicate
that her recovery may be reduced by the degree

of her

husband's

negligence-

[Hi. at 71,

(emphasis added).]
There is no basis in logic or law for any difference from the
decision in Feltch in this case.

If anything, the rationale for

not reducing the damages of heirs in a wrongful death case is
greater than in an injury case, since the damages recovered are
distinctly separate from that which could have been recovered by
13

the deceased, and there is no danger that the deceased will enjoy
the benefit of any recovery.

b.

Christie v. Maxwell

Christie v. Maxwell, 40 Wash. App. 40, 696 P.2d 1256 (Wash.
App. 1985), also involved a car-motorcycle collision.

There, the

Court held that despite the fact that the motorcycle driver was
found to be 62.5% negligent, his wife could recover the full
measure of any damages awarded to her for loss of consortium.
Once again, the Court's decision turned on whether the wife's
action was considered to be derivative to that of her husband.
Noting that under Washington law the wife's claims were not
derivative,

the

court

stated

that

the

claim

for

loss

of

consortium was separate and independent, and there was absolutely
no danger of unjust enrichment or double recovery.

It then set

forth what appellant here claims is the law uniformly throughout
the United States:
A review of other jurisdictions shows a
divergence of opinion on the issue of reducing
consortium damages.
Seer 21 A.L.R.3d 469-475
(Supp. 1984), and 25 A.L.R.4th 118-144 (1983).
Those that hold contributory negligence of
spouse bars recovery for loss of consortium base
their ruling on three different rationales - the
derivative nature of the action, imputed
negligence and assignee taking subject to
defenses against assignor.
However, those
jurisdictions which recognize the independent
nature of loss of consortium hold the award is
not affected by the injured spouse's negligence.
Fid, at 1259, emphasis added.]
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See also. Mayo v. Tri-Bell Industries, Inc., 787 F.2d 1007, 1012
(5th Cir. 1986),
In those minority comparative
negligence
jurisdictions that have not reduced the
plaintiff's damages for loss of consortium by
the percentage of negligence attributed to the
negligent spouse, it has been because, unlike
Texas, they do not consider the loss of
consortium to be a derivative source of damages.
c.

Brann v. Exeter Clinic, Inc.

Brann v. Exeter Clinic, Inc., 498 A.2d 334 (N.H. 1985), was a
wrongful death action involving two claims:

One for the benefit

of the deceased's estate, and the other brought by the wife of
the deceased for loss of consortium. The jury found defendants
49% negligent, the decedent 51% negligent, and awarded the wife
$300,000 for loss of consortium.

The New Hampshire Supreme Court

noting that the wife's claim was not derivative, ruled that the
wife's claim would not be barred or reduced by the verdict
rendered against the plaintiff in the negligence action.

See

3lS0/ Macon v, Seaward Construction Company, 555 F.2d 1, 2 (1st
Cir. 1977), applying New Hampshire law; and Goldman v. United
States, 790 F.2d 181, 185 n.4

(1st. Cir. 1986), in which the

Court stated:
To be sure, the district court's denial of
recovery to Goldman himself can be readily
upheld
under
the
Massachusetts
law
of
comparative negligence. The Court could properly
have found, and doubtless did find, that
Goldman's negligence was 'greater than the
amount of negligence attributable' to the
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defendant, and thus a bar to his own recovery,
(citations omitted) But under Massachusetts law

as ii now stands,

Goldman's

contributory

negligence would not bar his wife and children
from recovery - assuming the United States were
actually negligent here, (emphasis added.)

d. Herold v. Burlington Northern
in Herold v. Burlington Northern, Inc./ 761 F.2d 1241 (8th
Cir. 1985), the Eighth Circuit, applying North Dakota law, held
that the District Court had erred when it reduced a wife's $2.25
million judgment by the percentage of her co-plaintiff husband's
contributory negligence.
The status of North Dakota law governing the action was
exactly the same as existed in Utah in this case.

The court

held:
Although the court generally defers to the
district court's interpretation of local law, in
this case we believe the district court was
incorrect. Under North Dakota law it is clear
that a wife's claim for loss of consortium is an
independent right, not contingent upon the
rights, or liabilities of her husband, (citation
omitted) Furthermore, the negligence of a driver
cannot be imputed to his passenger.
(citation
omitted)
Also, the North Dakota contributory
negligence statute provides that recovery for
injury shall be reduced only "in proportion to
the amount of negligence attributable to the
person recovering." (emphasis in original.)
*

*

*

*

*

The contrary cases c i t e d by the defendants are
from s t a t e s which c o n s i d e r t h e l o s s of
consortium claims to be derivative actions.
[Id. at 1249].
16

e.

Morgan v. Lalumiere

In Morgan v. Lalumiere, 22 Mass, App. Ct. 262, 493 N.E.2d 206
(1986), the Court held that a spouse or child is not barred from
recovering from a negligent tortfeasor for his independent injury
even though his spouse or parent was more at fault than the party
against whom recovery is sought.

There, the injured party's

recovery was denied since the jury found he was 52% negligent,
compared with 48% for the defendant.

However, the court ruled

that the full amount of the judgment awarded the husband for loss
of consortium should stand, and reversed the trial court's
judgment N.O.V., thereby reinstating the full amount of the jury
verdict for the injured party's son.
As has been pointed out, the Utah Supreme Court has held that
the heirs' claims in a wrongful death case are not derivative.
In addition, the language of the Comparative Negligence Statute
applicable

to this case clearly

indicated

that

only the

negligence of those seeking recovery is relevant for comparative
purposes.

The conclusion, supported by the unanimous holding

from jurisdictions with similar law, is inescapable:

Darin

Kelson's negligence should not have been considered by the jury
for the purpose of barring or reducing appellant's claims.
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f. Additional Case Law,
Other courts which have ruled that the recovery by heirs or
family members for loss of consortium when another is injured or
killed is not reduced by comparative negligence include: Fuller
v. Buhrow, 292 N.W.2d 672 (Iowa 1980), in which the Court
persuasively set forth the following rationale for its decision:
To deny a consortium claim because of the
injured spouse's negligence would, in fact,
create a new kind of unfairness. It would force
the plaintiff, who was free from fault, to
assume the full burden of damages caused by the
negligence of others* It would also unjustly
permit the negligent tortfeasor to escape
liability altogether merely because of the
fortuitous negligence of another [Id. at 679.]
See also, Qlsen v, Bell Telephone Laboratories/ 445 N.E.2d 609,
612 (Mass. 1983); Dunn v. Rose Way. Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832-33
(Iowa 1983); Childers v. McGeer 306 N.W.2d 778 (Iowa 1981);
Handeland v. Brown, 216 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Iowa 1974); Vesey v.
Snohomish County. 721 P.2d 524 (Wash. App. 1986); Stapleton v.
Palmore, 162 Ga. App. 525, 291 S.E.2d 445 (1982); and LantJS V.
Condon, 95 Cal. App. 3d 152, 157 Cal. Rptr 22 (1979).

g.

Other Authorities.

The majority of legal commentators and authorities that have
considered the issue have determined that claims for loss of
consortium are not derivative, and should not be reduced by the
percentage of the injured party's negligence.
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See, e.g./

2 Harper & James, Torts § 23.8 (1956); Prosser, Torts § 125, at
937-38

(5th E d . ) ; Thompson & Chacon, "Loss of Consortium and

Contributory Negligence:

What's the Rule?"

Tex. Bar J., p. 834

(July 1985); Dickson, "Loss of Consortium; An Independent or
Derivative Cause of Action?" Trial, pg. 54 (Aug. 1986).

c.

Even If The Deceased Is More Than 5 0 % Negligent f tils.

Heirs 1 Claims Should Not Be Barred Under Utah Law.
In Utah, an injured party or the estate of a deceased can
only recover damages if the plaintiff is found to be less than
50% negligent.
also,

§

U.C.A. § 78-27-37 (1973, repealed 1986).

78-27-38

(1986) .

In this

case, the

jury

See
found

appellant's decedent Darin Kelson to have been 75% at fault for
his death.
However,

since

a wrongful

death

action

in Utah

is not

derivative, and particularly given the plain language of the
Comparative Negligence Statute applicable to this case, the nonnegligent heirs in a wrongful death action should be able to
recover the full measure of their damages if the defendant is at
fault to any degree.
That has been the unanimous conclusion in "non-derivative"
jurisdictions.

See, Morgan v. Lalumiere, supra, deceased 51% at

fault; Christie V. Maxwell, supra, injured party 62.5% at fault;
Lantis V. Condon, supra, injured party 80% at fault; Goldman v.
U.S.. suprar 790 F.2d at 185 n. 4.
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D.

Any Change In The Law Must Come From The Legislature.

It has and will be argued that it is unfair to allow the
heirs or relatives of a person to recover their full measure of
damages, including loss of consortium, where the deceased is
found to be partially or predominantly at fault for his own
injuries.

However, it is equally if not more unfair to deprive

family members of their separate and independent damages when
they were

in no way

at

fault, and there

is a third-party

tortfeasor whose conduct contributed to the cause of the injury
or death.
In those jurisdictions with law the same or similar to Utah,
the Courts have fulfilled their duty to apply the law, though
sometimes reluctantly, and held that if the law needs to be
changed for any reason, it is up to the legislature to do it.
Thus, in Feltch v. General Rental, supra, the Court held:
Ann Feltch was not found to be negligent, and
the statute does not indicate that her recovery
may be reduced by the degree of her husband's
negligence . . . ("the statute provides only
that a plaintiff1s recovery is to be reduced by
his or her own degree of fault, and in the
instant case, the wife was not at fault.") Any

change in the legislative policy as expressed in
the statute is foe the legislature, We are not
free to fashion remedies not sanctioned by the
words of the statute nor by the policies
underlying the statute. rid. 421 N.E.2d at 71
(emphasis added).]
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In Morgan v. Lalumiere, supra, where the injured party was
found to be 52% at fault, the Court held:
We recognize that, carried to its extreme, such
a rule may have incongruous results. A party
only slightly at fault would be compelled to
compensate a claimant for his full loss
notwithstanding a high degree of contributory
fault on the part of the claimant's spouse or
parent.
There is precedent in other states,
however, for a rule permitting recovery by a
plaintiff of the full amount of his loss even
though his spouse may have been considerably
more at fault than the party being sued.

(Citing, Lantis
Maxwell.)

EL. Condon and Christie
*

*

*

*

v.

*

If there is a potential for an unfair result in
an extreme case, the legislature may reform the
rule.
rid.. 493 N.E.2d at 212-13. (emphasis
added) . ]
Perhaps the best example of a Court's adherence to its duty
to apply the law occurs in Christie v. Maxwell, supra.
the

injured

spouse

was

found

to

be

62.5%

negligent.

Nevertheless, the court held:
While we may feel it is basically unfair to
allow Mrs. Christie 100 percent recovery from
Mr. Maxwell where her husband was 62.5 percent
contributorily negligent, we are constrained by
our interpretation of [the statute] and the
rules of statutory construction from reducing
her damages 62.5 percent.
*

*

*

*

*

"The Court cannot read into a statute that which
it may believe the legislature has omitted, be
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There,

it an intentional
(citation omitted).

or inadvertent omission."
[Id., 696 P.2d at 1260.]

The same rule applies in this case.
is possible

for

unfair

results

to

The law is clear.
ensue,

it

is

up

If it
to

the

exhibited

its

legislature to make the change.
The

Utah

Supreme

Court

has

deference to this principle.

very

recently

In Hackforti v. Utah Power & Light

£Q^f 59 U.A.R. 21 (Utah 1987), the Court denied spouses the right
to recover damages

for loss of consortium

opposed to a deceased

spouse.

for an injured, as

The decision was based on an

interpretation of the 1898 Married Women's Act, the meaning and
intent of which was at least subject to question; and despite the
fact that the law is virtually unanimous throughout the United
States that plaintiffs may recover loss of consortium
arising from serious injuries to their spouse.

damages

In so ruling, this

Court held:
If the cause of action argued for by the
plaintiff-appellant is to be created anew in
Utah, it should be done by the legislature.
Similarly, if appellant's right to recover damages for loss of
consortium in this case, clearly provided by unambiguous statutory
language is to be taken away or reduced, it should be done by the
legislature.
It is important to note that the Utah legislature has already
had one opportunity to amend the statutory language relied on by
appellant

on

this

case, but

did
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not

do

so.

In

1986, the

l e g i s l a t u r e abolished j o i n t and several l i a b i l i t y and completely
revised

the

Comparative

Negligence

section

of

the

Code,

Nevertheless, the present §78-27-38 (1986), s t i l l provides:
The fault of a person seeking recovery s h a l l not
alone bar recovery by t h a t person.
He may
r e c o v e r from any defendant QX group af
d e f e n d a n t s whose f a u l t exceeds h i s own.
(emphasis added.)
The heirs of Darin Kelson were not at fault at all.

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE SIBLINGS OF DARIN
KELSON COULD NOT RECOVER DAMAGES UNDER UTAH'S WRONGFUL DEATH
STATUTE.
Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-11-7 (1953), dealing with the wrongful

death of an adult, provides in relevant part as follows:
. . . only one action can be maintained for the
injury to or death of such person, and such
action may be brought by either the personal
representatives of such adult deceased person,
for the benefit of his heirs, or by such
guardian for the benefit of the heirs as
provided in the next preceding section [78-11-

6] . in every action under this and the next
preceding section [78-11-61 such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of the case
may be just, (emphasis added.)
The position that only the parents of Darin Kelson are
eligible

to recover damages

for his wrongful

death

relies

necessarily on a construction of the term "heirs" as defined in
Utah's Probate Code [§§ 75-1-201 (17); 75-2-103].
is misplaced.

This reliance

There is only one cause of action available for

all potential plaintiffs in a wrongful death action, Switzer v.
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Reynolds, 606 P.2d 244, 246 (Utah 1980), and that cause of action
belongs individually to those persons who suffer a loss by virtue
of the wrongful death*
It is illogical to rely on a technical intestate succession
definition in this context, since very rarely will a 21 year old
unmarried man leave a will or an estate.

A wrongful death action

has nothing whatever to do with intestate succession, the source
of the technical meaning of "heirs."

Rather, the proceeds of a

wrongful death action are separate from the deceased's estate and
belong individually to the persons injured as a result of the
wrongful death.

Switzer v. Reynoldsf suprar at 246.

persons, where the death involves an unemancipated

These

child or

adult, are the family of the deceased, including siblings.
In Chavez v. Regents of the University of New Mexico, 103
N.M. 606, 711 P.2d 883, 885-86
Court

held

that

the

(1985), the New Mexico Supreme

technical

definition

of

"personal

representative" in that state's Probate Code, did not apply to
wrongful death actions.

Consequently, the Court found that

"personal representative" in a wrongful death action could and
should be interpreted more liberally than the technical meaning
for probate actions.

Similarly, it makes sense here to include

the siblings of an unemancipated young man as "heirs" in a
wrongful death action.
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Appellant recognizes that there must be a line drawn at some
point to define the class of persons who may claim damages in any
given tort action.

To that end, appellant suggests that the only

logical line that can be drawn in a case involving the death of
an unemancipated person is that of his immediate family.
simply

impossible to say that the parents

of Darin

It is
Kelson

suffered injury as a result of his death, but that the brothers
and sisters he grew up with did not.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated explicitly that among the
primary elements of damage in a wrongful death action are the
emotional or "psychic" injuries suffered by loved ones such as
Darin Kelson's brothers and sisters in this case.

In Jones v.

Carvel1, 641 P.2d 105, 110 (Utah 1982), the court stated:
In this jurisdiction, we recognize that the
central loss resulting from the death of a child
results
from
the
destruction
of
those
intangible, but nevertheless very real human
relationships in which the blessings of love,
society and companionship are both given and
received with benefit to both the giver and the
receiver.
It is precisely such intangible injury for which Darin Kelson's
siblings seek redress in this case.
ignore the express

To deny their claims is to

language of the Utah Supreme Court, is

contrary to the statutory language that "such damages may be
given as under all the circumstances of the case may be just,"
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and excuses tortfeasors from compensation for readily foreseeable
injuries they have inflicted.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADMITTING A
STIPULATION RELATING TO THE ALLEDGED BLOOD ALCOHOL CONTENT
OF DARIN KELSON.
The

court's

attention

is

associated with this point.

directed

again

to

the

Put simply, appellant's

facts
former

counsel stipulated to the single most damaging piece of evidence
against his client without his knowledge or consent, and in fact
against his express directions.

Mr. Hansen later admits that he

had no authority to enter into the Stipulation, can't fathom why
he may have done it, and doesn't even remember doing it.
actually stated to the undersigned:

He

"I must have been drunk when

I did it."
It is universally held that while stipulations of counsel are
generally binding on the parties affected by them, relief from a
stipulation may be granted by a court in the exercise of its
discretion on the grounds of misrepresentation, inadvertence,
improvidence, where the stipulation was ill-advised, or if to set
aside the stipulation would avoid injustice rather than create
it.
The law is set forth generally in 83 C.J.S., Stipulations,
§§ 34-35

at

pp.88-93.

No

case

has

been

found

dealing

specifically with a stipulation regarding blood alcohol content
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of a victim in a wrongful death case.

However, the case law

uniformly holds that the decision on whether to grant relief from
a stipulation is a judgment call to be made on the particular
facts and circumstances of each case. Appellant asserts that a
more compelling case for relief from a stipulation would be
difficult to imagine.
Certainly, the best that can be said for the Stipulation was
that it was improvident and ill-advised. As to the latter, it is
important to note that the Stipulation was between appellant's
former "counsel," Robert Hansen, and Lou Midgley who died long
before the case came to trial. No one, including appellant or
trial counsel for both sides even knew about the Stipulation
until it was discovered in an old file.

It wasn't even filed

with the court until shortly before the original trial date.
Under the circumstances, appellant respectfully contends that
the trial

Court

abused

its discretion

in

admitting

the

Stipulation.
A.

Admission of the Stipulation Constituted

Pre judicial

Error.
Other than the Stipulation, respondents had absolutely no
evidence that Darin Kelson was intoxicated on the night he died.
On the other hand, appellant was able to produce testimony of
witnesses who were with Darin Kelson for the entire day prior to
his death, right up to minutes before the time of the collision.

27

Their uncontroverted testimony was that he had only one drink
several hours before the collision and that he looked and acted
perfectly sober at all times.
Nevertheless, in her closing argument to the jury, Deputy
County Attorney Pat Marlowe relied almost exclusively on Darin
Kelson's

alleged

intoxication

contributory negligence claim.

in

support

of

respondents 1

Intoxication was stressed no less

than 15. times in respondents1 closing argument.

[The full text

of the closing argument is attached for the Court's reference.
(See, Exhibit H) ]

These examples might help enlighten the Court

as to the tenor of the argument:
And Mr. Kelson undertook all those risks,
engaged in all those actions upon the occasion
of March 13, 1984, and now his parents want you
to give them money because of their son's
suicide.
That's exactly what it is.
This
individual voluntarily consumed alcohol, he
voluntarily intoxicated himself. [Exhibit H at
pp. 4-5.]
*

*

*

*

*

You have heard the intoxication evidence. You
know that his vision was (sic) impaired, and you
know that his reasoning was impaired, and you
know that his hearing was impaired.
You know
that his manual dexterity was impaired.
You
know that this man was operating a motorcycle
when he was drunk. And yet you are supposed to
believe that he couldn't have prevented the
accident. [Exhibit H at 11.]
It cannot be questioned that evidence of alleged alcohol
consumption and intoxication in a case involving a collision
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between a speeding motorcycle and a police car i s p r e j u d i c i a l in
the extreme. 6

I t i s also c l e a r t h a t respondents would not have

been unduly prejudiced i f the court had granted appellant r e l i e f
from the S t i p u l a t i o n .
appellant

to

put

All t h a t would have been required was for
on

a

consumption, i t s e f f e c t ,

proper

case

relating

to

alcohol

and the r e l i a b i l i t y of the blood t e s t

procedures used.
Appellant always has and continues to dispute the a l l e g a t i o n
t h a t Darin had been drinking and was i n t o x i c a t e d .
because

of

unauthorized

the

improvident,

Stipulation

that

ill-advised,
was admitted

However,

unwarranted
into

and

evidence,

a p p e l l a n t ' s case was dealt a crushing blow.
Appellant

contends t h a t the admission of the

Stipulation

under the circumstances was an abuse of d i s c r e t i o n r e s u l t i n g in
prejudicial error.

Appellant r e s p e c t f u l l y requests t h a t , upon

remand, that the Stipulation be held to be inadmissible.

0

C o n s e q u e n t l y , an a l t e r n a t i v e b a s i s for a p p e l l a n t ' s p o s i t i o n i s Rule 403,
Utah Rules of Evidence r which p r o v i d e s t h a t evidence should be excluded i f i t s
p r o b a t i v e v a l u e i s outweighed by i t s tendency t o confuse t h e j u r y , or i f i t i s
unduly p r e j u d i c i a l .
In t h i s c a s e , while t h e p u r p o r t e d S t i p u l a t i o n had l i t e r a l l y no p r o b a t i v e
v a l u e , i t was p r e j u d i c i a l i n t h e extreme. F u r t h e r , counsel for respondent was
allowed t o r e l y almost e x c l u s i v e l y on t h e n o n - e v i d e n c e of i n t o x i c a t i o n t o
inflame t h e j u r y . In s h o r t , by a l l o w i n g t h e S t i p u l a t i o n t o come i n , t h e t r i a l
Court gave r e s p o n d e n t s a wild c a r d t o p l a y t h a t was not earned or j u s t i f i a b l e
by any n o t i o n of f a i r n e s s , and which was i m p o s s i b l e f o r a p p e l l a n t t o c o u n t e r .
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CONCLUSION
Utah law clearly and expressly provides that any negligence
of the deceased should not be compared with that of a tortfeasor
for the purposes of determining liability and damages in a
wrongful death case.

The trial Court's instructions to the jury

to the contrary constituted reversible error.
The Court also erroneously excluded the siblings of Darin
Kelson from the class of persons entitled to damages for his
wrongful death.

In the case of a minor or adult, with no wife or

children, the only logical class for recovery under Utah's
Wrongful Death statute is the victim's immediate family.
Finally, the trial Court committed prejudicial reversible
error when it refused to grant appellant relief from a ridiculous
and expressly unauthorized Stipulation executed by two attorneys
who had nothing to do with the trial.

The Stipulation, involving

the alleged blood alcohol level of Darin Kelson at the time of
his death, was the single most damaging piece of "evidence" used
by respondents at trial. Although it was contrary to the direct
testimony

in the case, it was relied on quite heavily by

respondents' counsel in arguing the alleged fault of appellant's
decedent.
WHEREFORE, appellant respectfully requests that the judgment
below be reversed and remanded for a determination of damages
only.

If remanded for re-trial, appellant requests that it be
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with instructions to include the siblings of Darin Kelson as
persons eligible to recover damages; and that the blood alcohol
Stipulation be inadmissible.

DATED this (# " day of August, 1987.
COLLARD & RUSSELL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

#

day of August, 1937,

I mailed (4) copies of Appellant's Brief On Appeal to all
counsel of record for respondents at their address as shown
below, by depositing the same in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid.

DAVID E. YOCUM
Salt Lake County Attorney
PATRICIA J. MARLOWE
THOMAS L. CHRISTEMSEN
2001 South State #3400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200
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INSTRUCTION NO.
This

case

will

be

submitted

to

you

on

the

basis

of

comparative negligence.
If you find that the death of Darin Kelson was proximately
caused by a combination of the negligence of the defendant Perry
Buckner

and

the

negligence

of

Darin

Kelson,

then

you

must

determine the percentage of negligence you assign to defendant
Perry

Buckner

and the percentage

of negligence you assign to

Darin Kelson in causing the death of Darin Kelson.
In assigning percentages of negligence, you should keep in
mind that the percentage of negligence to a party is not to be
measured solely by the number of particulars in which a party is
found to have been negligent.
You should weigh the respective contributions, if any, of
each person to the death in question and considering the conduct
of

each

as

a

whole,

determine

whether

one

made

a

larger

contribution than the other, and if so, to what extent it exceeds
that of the other.

3£

Instruction Nc.

In corparing the negligence cf the respective parties, if you
find that the negligence attributable to Darin Kelson is 0 to 49%,
and the negligence of defendant Bjckner is greater than 5C%, then
the Kelsons will recover carnages against the defendants.
However, if the percentage of negligence you assign to Darin
Kelson is equal to or greater than the percentage of negligence
assigned to defendant Buckner, then the parents of Darin Kelson
will recover nothing on their claims.
Any percentage of negligence which you assign to Darin Kelson
will be used by the Court to reduce any damages that you award to
his parents.

In determining the amount of damages to the Kelsons

as a result of their son's death, you should not make any reduction
based on any percentage of negligence you attribute to Darin Kelson.
Any reduction that is necessary will be made by the Court.
Court will know what to do with your figures.

The
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL KELSON, personal
representative of the estate
of DARIN KELSON, deceased,

SPECIAL VERDICT
CIVIL NO.

C-84-5659

Plaintiff,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision, and PERRY
BUCKNER in a representative
capacity only,
Defendants.

We, the jury in the above-entitled action, for our Special
Verdict, answer the questions submitted as follows:
Question No. 1:
Answer:

Yes

Was defendant Perry Buckner negligent?
^

No

If your answer to question No. 1 was "no," do not
answer any further questions on the Special Verdict.
Question No. 2:

If your answer to question No. 1 was

"yes," was such negligence on the part of Perry Buckner a proximate
cause of Darin Kelson's death?
Answer:
If

Yes

No

y o u r answer t o q u e s t i o n

No. 2 was " n o , " do n o t

answer any f u r t h e r q u e s t i o n s on t h i s S p e c i a l V e r d i c t .
If

y o u r answer t o q u e s t i o n No. 2 i s " y e s , " go on t o

the next page.
EXHIBIT B
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Question No. 3:

Was the decedent Darin Kelson negligent

in operating his motorcycle?
Answer:

Yes

No

If your answer to question No. 3 vas "no," do not
answer question No. 4 in this Special Verdict.
Question No. 4:

If your answer to question No. 3 was

"yes/ 1 was such negligence on the part of decedent Darin Kelson
a proximate cause of his death?
Yes *

Answer:

No

If your answer to either question No. 3 or No. 4 was
"no," do not answer question No. 5.
Question No. 5:

Taking the combined negligence which

caused decedent Darin Kelson*s death at 100%, what percentage
of such negligence do you attribute to:
(a)

Perry Buckner

ZS

%

(b)

Darin Kelson

7$

%

100

%

TOTAL

If your answer to either question No. 1 or No. 2 was
"no," do not answer question No. 6.
Question No. 6:

What sum of money will fairly and reasonably

compensate plaintiffs for the loss of decedent Darin Kelson?
$

DATED this

Zf

day of January, 1987.

^

^

^

FOREPERSON
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July 26, 1985

Darrell Kelson
3220 South 7945 West
Magna, Utah 84044
Re: Wrongful death
Dear Darrell:
Yesterday I received 15 pages of photo copies of notes
I assume you made after talking to various persons.
The thrust of these statements seem to be that you want
to take issues with the fact that your son was not drinking as much
as the tests for blood alcohol indicate, not driving his motorcycle as
fast as the police claim.
As you know i t was my opinion that we'd have to accept
those facts and win in spite of them. With Val Shuppe's testimony
I think we can do that. However, since you seem determined to try
the case by fighting those facts i t would seem best for you to find
other counsel who agrees with that approach and pay me and Mr. DeBry
for what we've done to this point.
Please consider this and let me know soon.

Robert B. Hansen
RBH:hk
Cc: C. Richard Hendricksen
Rulon Burton & Associates

Exhibit D

KATHRYN COLLARD, #0697
J. STEPHEN RUSSELL, #2631
Attorneys for Plaintiff
401 Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL KELSON, personal
representative of the
Estate of Darin Kelson,
Plaintiff,

SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; and PERRY BUCKNER, in a
representative capacity only,

* AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT B. HANSEN
IN SUPPOPRT OF PLAINTIFF'S
* SECOND MOTION IN LIMINE

*

Civil No. C-84-5659
Judge Michael R. Murphy

Defendants.

SALT LAKE COUNTY)
:ss .
STATE OF UTAH
)
ROBERT B. HANSEN, being first duly sworn upon his oath,
deposes and states:
1. I was formerly counsel for the plaintiff in the above
referenced action.
2.

During the entire time I represented the plaintiff, I

was aware that the plaintiff vigorously contested that his son
was intoxicated at the time of the collision involved in this

case and that he believed there were irregularities in the
manner in which the blood sample was taken from his deceased
son, Darin Dee Kelson, after the collision.
3. At no time did the plaintiff authorize me to enter into
any stipulations with the defendants in this case with respect
to the results of a blood alcohol test alleged to have been
performed on plaintiff's decedent, Darin Dee Kelson, following
the collision.
4. In fact, I have no recollection of ever entering into
any stipulation with the defendants' former counsel, L.E.
Midgley, now deceased, regarding such matter.
DATED this 24th day of October, 1986.

/

6L*£TbL

*-*<*+*' +A*r*

ROBERT B. HANSEN
VERIFICATION
On October 24, 1986, personally appeared before me Robert
B. Hansen, who, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposed
and stated to me that he had read the foregoing document and
that he knows and understands the contents thereof and that the
same are true, to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief and that he signed the foregoing document in my
presence.

DATED this 24th day of October, 1986.

{

NOTARY PUBLIC
NOT;
Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah

My, Commission Expires:

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on this<^f day of Octoter, 1986,
I had a true and correct copy of the foregoing Affidavit
hand delivered Ms. Patricia Marlowe, Attorney for Defendants,
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, 241 East 400 South, Salt Lake
City, Utah, 84111.

rju^q.

K,

Exhibit E

KATnRYN CuLLARD, *Q69T
J. S7E?hEls
RUbSELL, #2631
Attorneys for Plaintiff
4ul Boston Building
Nine Exchange Place
Salt LaKe City, Utah 84111
IS THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DARRELL KELSON, personal
representative of the
Estate of Darin Kelson,

* AFFIDAVIT OF DARRELL KELSON
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S
* MOTION IN LIMINE

Plaintiff,

* Civil No. C-64-5659
Judge Michael R. Murphy
SALT LAKE COUNTY", a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; and PEPRY BUCKNER, in a
representative capacity only,
Defendants•

SALT LAKE COUNTY )
: ss.
STATE OF UTAH
)
DARRELL KELSON, being

first duly sworn upon his

oath,

deposes and states:
1. I am the plaintiff in the above entitled

action.

2. I make this Affidavit based upon personal
3. In September,

19S6, my counsel r

Kathryn

informed me of the existence of a Stipulation
executed on my behalf by my former attorney,

knowledge.

Coilard,

purportedly
Robert

Hansen,

EXHIBIT 2

relating to the authenticity of a document purporting to
be a toxicology report on the blood alcohol content of the
body of my deceased son, Darin Kelson, at the time of his
death.
4. Prior to the time Ms. Collard informed me of the
existence of the Stipulation, I had no knowledge concerning
the Stipulation and had never discussed it with Mr. Hansen
and had never authorized him to agree or execute the said
Stipulation in my behalf.
5. Because of my personal belief that there were
irregularities in the manner in which the blood sample was
taken from my son/ and because 1 believe such evidence is
irrelevant to any issue in the above entitled action and
that its introduction at trial would be prejudicial to my
case, I would not have authorized Mr. Hansen to execute
the Stipulation, and request that this Court permit the
Stipulation to be withdrawn.
DATED this 21st day of October, 1986.

/; }S \t, ;

j

Affiant

d^y of October,
0
SUBSCRIBED TO AND SWORN BEFORE ^ £ this 21st d/y
1986.
My Commission Expires:

t.

MO

Residing at Salt Lake City, Utah
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August 26, 1385

Darrell Kelson
3220 South 7945 West
Magna, Utah 84044
Dear Darrell:
Under seperate cover I am sending you papers from your
file that may be of use to successor counsel.
I understand you have picked up your file from Mr. Hendricksen,
I estimate I have spent over three hours on your case so you
owe me $300 out of any settlement or verdict you obtain. Please
confirm that debt.
Yetfrk truly,

.

Robert B. Hansen
RBHrhk
Cc: C. Richard Hendricksen
350 South 500 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Material mailed under S.C.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
DARRELL KELSON, Personal
Representative of the
Estate of Darin Kelson,

C84-5659

Plaintiffs,
vs.
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a political
subdivision of the State of
Utah; and PERRY BUCKNER, in a
representative capacity only,

REPORTER'S PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT

Defendants.
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 28th day of January,
1987, the above-entitled action came on regularly for
hearing before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, Judge
in the Third Judicial District for the State of Utah,
and was reported by me, Gayle B. Campbell, a Registered
Professional Reporter and Notary Public in and for the
State of Utah.
A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiff:

Kathryn Collard and
J. Stephen Russell
Attorneys at Law
401 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

For the Defendants;

Patricia J. Marlowe and
Thomas L. Christensen
Deputy County Attorneys
231 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

GAYLE B. CAMPBELL
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REFQZUZ
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

1 Salt Lake City, Utah
2
3

January 28, 1987

P R O C E E D I N G S
(Excerpt of proceedings containing closing argument

4 of Patricia Marlowe representing the State of Utah.)
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed, Ms.
5
Marlowe.
6
MS. Marlowe: I am, Your Honor.
7
THE COURT: Go ahead.
8

MS. MARLOWE:

May it please the Court,

9 counsel, members of the jury:

You will be happy to know

10 that it's almost your turn, that the lawyers' turns are
11 almost over, and that you do not have to listen to either
of us anymore. You have to listen to me and Ms. Collard
12
again, then it's up to you. You get to retire and deliberate,
13
and you're going to decide what the facts and circumstances
14
were as they occurred on March 13, 1984, at the time of
15 this collision between Perry Buckner's patrol car and
16 Darrell Kelson's motorcycle.
17

I want to remind you that the hard part for

18 you lies just ahead, that it's not easy to be jurors,
19

and I would ask you to recall the oath that you took.
You agreed that you were going to decide this case based

20
upon the facts and based upon the law as the Court has
21
instructed you on.
22

And that oath is sacred and you have

to follow that oath and you are bound by the facts and

23 Jyou are also bound by the law.
24

You also agreed that you would not decide this

25 |case based upon sympathy, and you have been instructed
2

1

that you will not decide this case based on sympathy.

2

So the fact that an individual died, and unfortunately

3

died, is not a basis for making your decision in this
case.

Specifically, you cannot find that the defendant

4
Buckner was negligent solely based upon the fact that
5
D a r i n Kelson was killed on March 13, 1984.
6

Rather,

you have been instructed by the Court that you must find

7

that there was a breach of some duty, or some negligence

8

which proximately caused the death of D a r i n Kelson.

9

And further, you have been instructed that you would then

10
11

have to make some determination of damage.

But you have

to consider those instructions which the Court has given
you, which you will take with you to the jury room, in arriving

12
at your decision in this case.
13

Let's examine what you have seen and heard over

14

these many days and talk about some of the exhibits and

15

what bearing they have on your consideration of this case.

16

You all know now that Darin

17

that according to the defendant's version of the facts

18

D arin

Kelson was a young man,

Kelson consumed at least five drinks sometime

on March 13, 1984, and that he left his house on his motorcycle
19
and was on his way to work.

That he deliberately turned

20
in front of a peace officer, Officer Wilden, that he acceler21

ated rapidly and deliberately drew the peace officer's

22

attention, or the officer's attention such that he caused

23

Officer Wilden to attempt to make a stop for speeding.

24
25

And Officer Wilden activated his light and siren,
and Mr. Kelson did not stop.

Mr. Kelson at that minute
3

1

in time could have prevented this whole incident just

2

by reason of stopping for the speeding violation.

But

oh, no, probably involved by the alcohol, feeling euphoric,

3

he proceeded to engage in a high speed dangerous chase
4
with Officer Wilden, which ultimately culminated in his
5
death.
6

And during that chase Mr. Kelson again had an

7

opportunity to stop, and Mr. Kelson did not stop.

Mr.

8 II Kelson saw the police officers upon two occasions, at
g I the time he turned in front of the police prior to the
time this chase ever really began, and saw him again throughout

10

the chase clearly.

11

Mr. Kelson was aware that there was

a peace officer following him, that there was a siren
12

going, that there were lights going, but instead he led
13

the officer through the subdivision, violating all speed

14

laws, and continued from this to flee from this police

15 officer in violation of Utah state law.
16 I

And then when Mr. Kelson pulled on to 5400 South,

or 5415 South, which later becomes 5400 South, he was

17

on a straight away.

18

He had a straight shot, and arguably

he opened up his speed.

He was on this high production

19

bike that he thought and he knew and he was confident,
20

probably by reason of his intoxication, that he could
21

outrun this peace officer, and he proceeded to try and

22

do so,

23 A
24
9S

And Mr. Kelson undertook all those risks, engaged
in all those actions upon the occasion of March 13, 1984,

„and now his parents want you to give them money because

i

of their sons suicide.

2

individual voluntarily consumed alcohol, he voluntarily

3

That's exactly what it is.

This

intoxicated himself.
You have heard from the Court that a blood level

4

in excess of .08 is unlawful.

It is unlawful with that

5
| blood level to operate a motor vehicle in the State of
6

Utah.

Mr. Kelson's blood alcohol level was in excess

7

of that amount.

8

and yet he operated this motorcycle.

9

what we're talking about is a high powered motorcycle,

10
11

He was at .11 percent blood alcohol,
You all realize

and we're talking about an instrumentality that probably
a lot of you would say was dangerous, and I believe Mrs.
Kelson didn't like that motorcycle.

She implied that

12
it was not safe, her son engaging in the operation of a
13
motorcycle
14
15
16

at high speeds in violation of traffic laws

and while he's intoxicated.

And for that conduct these

plaintiffs want you to award them damages.
I can also indicate to you that Mr. Kelson,

17

while fleeing from the officers, failed to keep to the

18

right, that he could have avoided this traffic accident

19

or this accident if he was driving to the right.

This

collision occurred in a left turn lane, more towards the
20
center of the intersection.
21
If Mr. Kelson had been watching where he was
22

I going, if Mr. Kelson had been driving 45 miles an hour

23

or had been driving at even a lesser speed, he would not

24

have hit that officer's patrol car, Perry Buckner's patrol

25

car in that intersection.

1
2
3

Yet plaintiffs have twisted this case and turned
it upon its head and they are saying, well, but for the
fact that Buckner was in the intersection, this death
would never have occurred.

This death would never have

4
occurred but for the fact that Darin

Kelson was intoxicated

5
| on March 13, 1984, he voluntarily became intoxicated,
6
7

he got on a motorcycle, he ran from police officers, deliberately engaging their pursuit.

8
9
10

He must have felt euphoric in that he continued
to drive in violation of all traffic laws or all traffic
laws as you have been so instructed, and he failed to
keep a proper lookout.

11
You have testimony that when the chase turned
12
on to 5415 South that it was elevated and the road was
13

raised.

And so you have Officer Wilden at one point seeing

14

the officers clearly at this intersection because all

15

of these patrol cars were in elevated areas.

16
17
18

And so the only person who might somehow

—

or the person that can see best in this particular case
would be this D a r i n Kelson.

You have him at this high

point looking across the people and could have seen
19
Officer Buckner's patrol car as well as the other patrol
20
cars, assuming that the road continues down, and there
21

is some evidence to indicate the directions.

He was clearly

22

in a better position to see the two patrol cars who had

23

these huge overhead lights than these patrol cars were

24

able to see this single little light on the motorcyclist

25

that arguably was lost in the depression.
6

1
2
3

Plaintiffs make a big deal about there were
all these officers and they saw the motorcyclist but Buckner
didn't.

They somehow suggest to you that he deliberately

pulled out into the path of the motorcycle.

And if he

4
didn't do it deliberately, then he did it negligently
5
or carelessly because he should have known that that motorcycle
6

was right up, coming right at him.

7

What he didn't tell you —

what plaintiffs failed

8

to tell you is that Mr. Kelson was in the best position

9

to see anything in this case, but that he failed to look.

10 He is the person who failed to keep a proper lookout.
Instead, he engages in this reckless conduct and he drives
11
this motorcycle in a reckless and dangerous fashion.
12
How is a reasonable peace officer supposed to
13
detect a single headlight moving toward him at excessive
14

speed?

Why should that light not get lost in all of the

15

backlight around the area?

16

spotlight was not lost in the depression in the road at

17

the time that Perry Buckner was looking eastbound and

18

How do you know that single

looking for this motorcyclist?
Of course, as I say, plaintiffs have turned

19
this case around on its head, and that everything that
20
happened was because of Perry Buckner.
21

They want to start

at the end of the collision and the death of

Darin

22

and they want to blame everything that happened prior

23

to that time on Perry Buckner.

24
25

Kelson,

If Mr. Kelson had not speeded, he could not
have collided with Perry Buckner.

If Mr. Kelson had not
7

1

fled from peace officers, there wouldn't have been any

2 | chase.

And Perry Buckner would have had no reason to

be assisting in some fashion in watching the progress
of this chase.
But oh, no, argued the plaintiffs.

Everything

that happened in this case happened because of the negligence
of Perry Buckner.

I would submit to you that there was

no negligence on the part of Perry Buckner, and the fact
8 II that Mr. Buckner was unable to see a motorcyclist traveling
g I at him at a high rate of speed was in fact the reason
10
11

he pulled out in the path of this motorcyclist, which
was an innocent mistake.

It was not deliberate and intentional

and it was not unlawful.

We have had lots of discussions

12
about what the law requires.

Clearly all police vehicles

13
or emergency vehicles pursuant to State law are required
14

to sound sirens or make some other audible noise as reasonably

15

necessary.

16

to be equipped with lights.
However, State law also says that police vehicles

17
18

And further, that emergency vehicles are required

do not have to display lights, do not have to be equipped
with or display lights.

So then the status of a police

19
vehicle is that, at most, in order to drive in violation
20
of any traffic laws or of any laws, all a police vehicle
21
22

has to do, when engaged in an emergency, is sound a siren,
if reasonably necessary.

23 I

Ladies and gentlemen, what would a siren have

24 | done in this case, assuming that the intersection light

25

was red?

What good would this siren have done?

How would
8

1

it have alerted Mr. Kelson to the danger ahead at the

2

intersection?

3

He had already heard —

here is Mr. Kelson

barreling along, arguably at speeds in excess of 76 miles
an hour, and that bike was capable of 140 miles an hour.

4
|

So you have this individual on a highway driving

5
a high powered motorcycle which can be very noisy.
6

You

know from the testimony which was elicited by the plaintiff

7

that this individual was wearing a full shield, a full

8

helmet shield.

9

for the failure to activate a siren at this intersection,

10

But they want you to believe that but

that that accident would never have occurred.
Mr. Kelson had two police vehicles chasing him,

11
two police vehicles displaying lights, two police vehicles
12
running sirens, but somehow this third siren at some location
13
14
15

in front of Mr. Kelson was going to alert him to the danger
at the intersection.
Mr. Kelson, you know, because he was intoxicated,
because he was fleeing from officers, he was still required

17
18

to operate as a reasonable and prudent driver.

He still

|has an obligation under the Utah laws to not enter intersections at excessive speeds.

He was required to keep

19
a proper lookout.
20
I submit that he violated all of those laws
21

in the course of his fleeing from these peace officers.

22

That the only reason that his death occurred was because

23

of his carelessness, because he was negligent, and because

24

he was intoxicated.

25

Perry Buckner just happened to be the individual

1

that was in the intersection upon the happening of this

2 1 collision.

It could have been someone else.

I mean,

let f s say that the light was green and Mr. Stromberg pulled

3

out.

And so you have Mr. Kelson driving up the road at

4
a high rate of speed, and for some reason he turns over
5
and he hits Mr. Stromberg.
6

Well, Mr. Stromberg would

be here in front of you.

7

How do you know that some other individual might

8 II not have entered that intersection, other than defendant
g I Buckner?
were.

10

You don't know.

You don't know what risks there

Those types of risks Mr. Kelson was chargeable

with at the time he engaged in this unlawful activity.
11
That he should have known and he should have appreciated
12
that there could have been risks, as he fled from these
13
police officers, and that he should have known that speeding
14
15

—

you know, it brings about problems, and speeding can

II cause a c c i d e n t s .

16 I
17
18

He clearly should have known that speeding combined
with intoxication can be fatal, and in fact was fatal.
He should have known that someone could have been in the
intersection.

He had no reason to rely upon the fact

19
that the light was red or green.

There is a lot of controversy

20
over the color of the light, but here Mr. Kelson is, and
21
22

do you believe he was looking ahead, saying, oh, the light
is green.

I can go through the light and no one is going

23 I to run into me?
24

25

He wasn't thinking, ladies and gentlemen.

The

only thing he was concentrating on was managing that
10

1 motorcycle at a high rate of speed.
2
3

ication evidence.

You have heard the intox-

You know that his vision wasn!t impaired,

and you know that his reasoning was impaired.
that his hearing was impaired.

You know

You know that his manual

4
dexterity was impaired.
5

You know this man was operating

a motorcycle when he was drunk.

And yet you are supposed

6

to believe that he couldn't have prevented this accident.

7

It was his very course of conduct that resulted

8

in this collision.

9

all those risks, that he is the person who put himself

10
11

That he is the person that undertook

in that place and caused this chain of events.

But for

his actions on the night of March 13, 1984, nothing would
have happened.

The fact that Mr. Buckner may have been

12
in the intersection is not the cause of the collision.
13

The cause of the collision was the intoxication and irrespon-

14 sibility and negligent conduct of the deceased, which
15 resulted in this collision, which resulted in his death.
16

Counsel has made a point about the color of

17 the light, but let me just say that, since this is my
18

only opportunity, that the only person that gave any evidence
at the time of the collision relative to the color of

19
the light was Andrew Burton.

And I invite you to examine

20
(plaintiffs' Exhibit 19P —
21

excuse me —

that was Mr. Stromberg,

There is an exhibit, and I won't bother to look for it,

22 but look at Andrew Burton's statement.

It was taken contem-

23 poraneously or shortly after this accident.

I would submit

24 that's the best evidence of what occurred.

In that statement

25 he says that the light was in favor of Buckner.
11

Counsel suggests to you that, oh, gee, Mr. Toone
had all this wonderful information, and of course he went
to see John T. Nielsen, and he told him what a jerk this
cop was and what charges ought to be issued against Deputy
Buckner.
John T. Nielsen just couldnft issue charges
against one of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Deputies.
There was no evidence to support those claims, and there's
no evidence to show that Mr, Nielsen conducted himself
in less than a professional and responsible manner.

He

is the chief criminal deputy for Salt Lake County.
And in any event, this so-called wonderful note,
there is nothing contained within the notes that Officer .
Toone gathered and gave to Mr. Nielsen that at any time
indicated that Mr. Greer knew what color the light in
the intersection was.

Read the notes, read the exhibits.

That is missing from any documents that were ever presented,
and I just want to flash plaintiffs' Exhibit 7P, and I
want to show you the work product of this professional
peace officer, Officer Toone.

This is Officer Toone's

idea of professionalism in reporting.

But he's just pro-

fessional, and that's one of his notes, and maybe you
ought to look at plaintiffs' Exhibit 8P, Mr. Toone's notes
again.
He doesn't do any comprehensive reporting here.
He doesn't put anything down that relates, but he comes
in and tells you that Mr. Greer said, "Yes, the light
was red."
12

1
2
3

There is no such such statement in the note
relative to Mr. Greer's statement,

Tropper Toone has

misrepresented to you the testimony of the witnesses,
that as he knew it at the time of the investigation, at

4
the time he approached Mr. Nielsen for criminal charges.
5
In fact, there is no evidence to suggest that Tropper
6
7

Toone at any time tried to convince Mr. Nielsen there
ought to be criminal charges.

The only evidence before

8 jl you is that Toone made a somewhat sloppy investigation
g I of this matter, that he clearly developed some bias relative
10

to defendant Buckner, that he did kind of a half-baked
investigation.

11
I mean, there is nothing stylish about his reports,
12
and there is nothing thorough about his investigation.
13
They hired him.
14
15

He hired himself out so that he could

be paid.

So he investigates this as a highway patrol

officer.

He claims he's impartial, and yet he's been

16 [I around this courtroom.
17
18

You have seen him.

He has sat

in since he testified and was excused as a witness, listening
to what was going on.
Now, are those the actions of an unbiased and

19
impartial person?

I mean, what motivated Tropper Toone

20
to come here and try and blame this accident on Perry
21
Buckner.
22

You tell me that any of the conclusions that

he testified to are reasonable conclusions, conclusions

23 |that a responsible accident reconstructionist or experienced
24 I and responsible accident investigator would have arrived

25

at.
13

1

Where does he get this 70-30 comparison of negligence^

2 He wants you to believe that Buckner, by reason of an
3
4

innocent mistake, in that he did not see the motorcycle,
he believed because of this dispatch communication that
the motorcyclist was two blocks away from him, and he

5
claims —

he says the light changed green, he saw Mr,

6

Stromberg, and he says that Bucknerfs actions in pulling

7

into that intersection were negligent.

8

was improper lookout.

9

light.

10
11

He says that it

He tells you that he broke a red

Mr. Toone wasn't at that accident.

know what went on.
what's possible.

He doesn't

He just comes to court and tells you

He says he read so and so's statement,

and he believes that to be the facts.

He doesn't go out

12
and time those lights, he didn't do anything.
13

All he

did was come to court and give you conjecture and say

14 that this is who I blame and you ought to believe me because
15

I'm such a great expert.

16

says the light was red.

He tells you that Mr. Stromberg
That is a lie, ladies and gentlemen.

f
17 Read the written statement that was given to the Sheriff s

18

office at the time of the accident.

Mr. Stromberg made

no such statement.
19
You saw Mr. Stromberg in court.

Did he tell

20
you the light was red at the time of the collision?
21

Mr. Stromberg said he didn't know.

No.

But anyway, Toone

22

keeps saying that gee, this occurred because I had all

23

this unimpeachable evidence, and the light was red and

24 Buckner is negligent.
25

There was no such evidence to support those
14

1

conclusions.

2

facts, and he twisted the testimony and manufactured this

3

case.

All he's done is torture the facts, whatever

In fact, this case is based solely upon the testimony

of Toone.
4
I mean that every allegation, every assertion
5
made by plaintiffs is based upon Trooper Toone, and Trooper
6

Toone said this and Trooper Toone said that.

7

Finallyf ladies and gentlemen, you are supposed to

8

decide this evidence based upon the facts, exhibits, and

9

you are supposed to decide based upon what you have seen

10
11

here today.

I submit that you ought not to listen and

you ought to discredit any of the testimony put forth
by Trooper Toone, that he is not impartial, that he is

12
biased, and that he's been paid in this case and he became
13

a paid expert and he is not objective.

14

If he were so concerned about the failure to

15

file criminal charges in this matter, why didn't he appeal

16

it to a higher level?

17 he did anything?
18

Whatever evidence is there that

He comes into court and he claims, well,

he told John T. this and he told John T. that, and he
suggests that —

he doesn't outright, you know, testify

19
that John T. just didn't listen to anything he had to
20
say.
21

There is no evidence of that, ladies and gentlemen.

22 All he has done is try and take advantage.

Mr. Nielsen

23 comes to court and tells us that as part of his duties
24 he reviewed the facts and circumstances and that he found
25 there's no criminal negligence.

And that to the best
15

1

of his recollection there are no problems with this case.

2 I Is it because Mr. Toone isn't mentioned in John Nielsen's
letter to Sheriff Hayward, wherein Mr. Nielsen sets forth

3

his opinions and findings?

Is it because Mr. Toone isn't

4
mentioned in that letter that Mr. Toone is upset?

Is

5
he upset because Mr. Nielsen didn't say that because of
6

the marvelous work of Officer Toone, that I reached my

7 il
conclusions?
8 |

What happened in this case, ladies and gentlemen?

9 I That's for you to decide. This matter comes to the office,
10
it goes out, there are no waves, then suddenly here's
11
Mr. Toone. Of course, you see, Mr. Toone didn't think
12

there was any 70-30 comparative negligence until after

13

he was retained and paid by plaintiffs' counsel.

14

he continues to tell you that he's not biased.

15

today we came to court and he was recalled in rebuttal,

But
Of course

and as you will recall, Mr. Christensen asked him, you
16 A know, why he continued to be around the courtroom and
17
18
19

w

h y he was here, and he said it was because he was an

interested party.
This witness is confusing himself with the parties,
He doesn't know about he's not a party to this lawsuit.

20
The only parties are the plaintiffs and the defendants.
21
He is just a witness, and now somehow he's become a party?
22
If I could just go through quickly, I hope,
23 II you have heard all the evidence and I'm sure you're tired
24

of all the evidence, but you will recall Kevin Judd.

25

He was in the car with Perry Buckner, and the only thing
16
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so maybe he should have told Buckner,

1

though Buckner would have been distracted from listening

2

to the dispatch.

3

You know, this whole incident occurred

within two and a half minutes.
the collision

You heard the tape, and

occurred long before the end of that tape.

4
So you have a chase, a high speed chase, and it goes fast,
5
and then this individual is dead.
6

This isn't something that happened over a protracted

7

period of time.

8

of the tape it will suggest to you some time length.

9

Ladies and gentlemen, you heard the trial, and you heard

10

If you read the written transcription

the copy of the dispatch time.
really quickly.

You know this happened

So you have officers that are trying

11
to assist the situation, they are listening, and they
12
are figuring out, and Perry Buckner is sitting at that
13

intersection relying upon what was being broadcast, and

14

from the dispatcher he hears that this motorcyclist is

IS

two blocks away.

16

he saw the light had changed to green, he crossed the

17

And based upon that and the fact that

intersection and Mr. Kelson ran into the patrol vehicle.
Mr. Stromberg.

I have already indicated to

18
you that Mr. Stromberg came to court and he never testified
19

as to the color of the light because he doesn't know.

20

In his witness statement he enver offered an opinion as

21

to the color of the light.

22

of people, and he's never been sure.

23

you say, was the light red?

He's been interviewed by lots

"Yes."

And he just goes back and forth.

You saw him, and
Was the light Green?

He doesn't know.

24
And he's not real positive.

You saw him.

You make that

25
18
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:

1

behalf of the plaintiffs.

2

that he's friendly with the plaintiffs and the family

But he's biased in this case,

and he would like to see them recover some money.
that he was friendly with the deceased.

Further,

So he's come

and he's manufactured his testimony for the sole purpose
of trying to convince you that you ought to award some
money to this family.

7I
|
8

Talking about damages, of course, isn't our
favorite subject, and I just want to point out to you

g J) that we're not talking about an individual who was an
10
astronaut or one of the Kennedys, we're talking about
11
a young individual who had no substantial schooling, had
12

a job, you know, for a short period of time at Hercules.

13

Of course they will claim that he was going to work there

14

forever.

15

of going to work drunk, you probably could not retain

W e would submit that if you made it a habit

your employment for very long.

But that's what we're

16 [I talking about, ladies and gentlemen.
17
18

the worth of individuals.

And of course you know all

individual lives have worth.
19

We're talking about

That's not the point.

The

point is that if you should feel that damages are necessary,

20

that the damages have to be reasonable, and you can't

21

just award damages because you feel sorry for someone,

22

that you have to do it reasonably.
There's been a discussion also about percentage

23 II of negligence.

Of course Deputy Probert said that he

24 I felt that Mr. kelson was 100% negligent. And I would
25
concur with that opinion. Look at the evidence. I m e a n ,
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. .. . :, gence
We ask
21

1

you to find that the death of D a r i n Kelson was caused

2

solely by the negligent actions of D arin

3

Kelson.

Thank

you for your attention.
(Further proceedings reported but not included

4
in this partial transcript.)
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